Papers

Published

Searching for Epistemic Norms that Matter, Analysis (forthcoming)

Epistemologists are engaged, among other things, in the business of formulating epistemic norms. That is, they formulate principles that tell us what we should believe and to what degree of confidence, or how to evaluate such epistemic states. In The End of Epistemology As We Know It, Brian Talbot argues that thus far, most of the theories resulting from these efforts are flawed. In this critical notice I examine three of his arguments. 

Carbon Offsetting, Ethics, Policy & Environment (forthcoming)

Carbon offsetting schemes play a prominent role in achieving emissions reduction goals. John Broome (2012) argues that emitting greenhouse gasses and offsetting, that is, essentially, contributing funding to a project that would reduce an equal amount of emissions, is morally equivalent to not emitting at all. Broome expresses in a clear manner an argument that in one form or another is widely endorsed. The argument relies on two premises, one descriptive and the other normative: (1) When you emit and offset, the net result is the same and of not emitting. (2) With emissions, the net result is what matters morally. In this article I raise a series of objections against each of these premises.

I talk about carbon offsetting ethics in Hebrew in this podcast episode. 

What Makes Something Surprising? (with Oded Na’aman), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105:1 (2022), 195–215

That an unknown person won a lottery is unsurprising. But if you win, or if the winner was predicted by a clairvoyant, those would be surprising facts. Why? In this paper we develop a novel answer. Along the way, we clarify the issue employing new insights from the fittingness-of-emotions literature. (Watch our presentation here).

How Can Necessary Facts Call for Explanation?, Synthese 198:12 (2021), 11607–11624

While there has been much discussion about what makes some mathematical proofs more explanatory than others, and what are mathematical coincidences, in this article I explore the distinct phenomenon of mathematical facts that call for explanation. The existence of mathematical facts that call for explanation stands in tension with virtually all existing accounts of “calling for explanation”, which imply that necessary facts cannot call for explanation. In this paper I explore what theoretical revisions are needed in order to accommodate this phenomenon. One of the important upshots is that, contrary to the current consensus, low prior probability is not a necessary condition for calling for explanation. In the final section I explain how the results of this inquiry help us make progress in assessing Hartry Field’s style of reliability argument against mathematical Platonism and against robust realism in other domains of necessary facts, such as ethics. 

Modal Security (with Justin Clarke-Doane), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2021), 162–183

Modal Security is a proposed necessary condition for undermining defeat. It has been widely discussed of late. The principal is of interest because it seems to entail that influential epistemological arguments, including Evolutionary Debunking Arguments against moral realism and the Benacerraf-Field Challenge for mathematical realism, are unsound. Modal Security says, roughly, that if evidence undermines (rather than rebuts) one’s belief, then one gets reason to doubt the belief’s safety or sensitivity. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine Modal Security in detail. We begin by presenting the principle and its motivations as well as the role it plays in the debunking arguments debate. We then develop and discuss what we take to be the strongest objections to the principle, and see what can be said in response. Six such arguments, as well as a worry that epistemic justification requires a “connection” between the beliefs and the facts, are developed, discussed and criticized. The article reveals how the debate surrounding Modal Security interacts with core problems in epistemology—including the generality problem and the distinction between direct and indirect evidence.

A Moral Argument against Absolute Authority of the Torah, Sophia 60:2 (2021), 307–329

I argue against the Orthodox Jewish view that the Torah should be treated as an absolute authority. I begin with an explanation of what it means to treat something as an absolute authority. I then review examples of norms in the Torah that seem clearly immoral. Next, I explore reasons that people may have for accepting a person, text, or tradition as an absolute authority in general. I argue that none of these reasons can justify absolute authority if the authority prescribes norms that we strongly judge to be immoral. I then respond to three objections to my argument. I end with a note explaining why, contrary to a popular trend, the narrative of the binding of Isaac is not a good place to start this discussion. 

* The Association for the Philosophy of Judaism held an online symposium on this paper.

Calling for Explanation: The Case of the Thermodynamic Past State (with Orly Shenker), European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10:36 (2020)

Philosophers of physics have long debated whether the Past State of low entropy of our universe calls for explanation. What is meant by “calls for explanation”? In this article we analyze this notion, distinguishing between several possible meanings that may be attached to it. Taking the debate around the Past State as a case study, we show how our analysis of what “calling for explanation” might mean can contribute to clarifying the debate and perhaps to settling it, thus demonstrating the fruitfulness of this analysis. Applying our analysis, we show that two main opponents in this debate, Huw Price and Craig Callender, are, for the most part, talking past each other rather than disagreeing, as they employ different notions of “calling for explanation”. We proceed to show how answering the different questions that arise out of the different meanings of “calling for explanation” can result in clarifying the problems at hand and thus, hopefully, to solving them.

No Need to Get Up from the Armchair (If You Are Interested in Debunking Arguments in Metaethics), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23:3–4 (2020), 575–590

Several authors believe that metaethicists ought to leave their comfortable armchairs and engage with serious empirical research. This paper provides partial support for the opposing view, that metaethics is rightly conducted from the armchair. It does so by focusing on debunking arguments against robust moral realism. Specifically, the article discusses arguments based on the possibility that if robust realism is correct, then our beliefs are most likely insensitive to the relevant truths. These arguments seem at first glance to be dependent on empirical research to learn what our moral beliefs are sensitive to. It is argued, however, that this is not so. The paper then examines two thought experiments that have been thought to demonstrate that debunking arguments might depend on empirical details and argues that the conclusion is not supported.

A Strike against a Striking Principle, Philosophical Studies 177:6 (2020), 1501–1514.

Several authors believe that there are certain facts that are striking and cry out for explanation—for instance, a coin that is tossed many times and lands in the alternative sequence HTHTHTHTHTHT… (H=heads, T=tails). According to this view, we have prima facie reason to believe that such facts are not the result of chance. I call this view the striking principle. Based on this principle, some have argued for far-reaching conclusions, such as that our universe was created by intelligent design, that there are many universes other than the one we inhabit, and that there are no mathematical or normative facts. Appealing as the view may initially seem, I argue that we lack sufficient reason to accept it.

How Close Are Impossible Worlds? : A Critique of Brogaard and Salerno’s Account of Counterpossibles, dialectica 73:3 (2019)

Several theorists have been attracted to the idea that in order to account for counterpossibles, i.e. counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, we must appeal to impossible worlds. However, few have attempted to provide a detailed impossible worlds account of counterpossibles. Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno’s ‘Remarks on Counterpossibles’ is one of the few attempts to fill in this theoretical gap. In this article, I critically examine their account. I prove a number of unanticipated implications of their account that end up implying a counterintuitive result. I then examine a suggested revision and point out a surprising implication of the revision.

Why Do Certain States of Affairs Call for Explanation? A Critique of Two Horwichian Accounts, Philosophia 47:5 (2019)

Motivated by examples, many philosophers believe that there is a significant distinction between states of affairs that are striking and therefore call for explanation and states of affairs that are not striking. This idea underlies several influential debates in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, normative theory, philosophy of modality, and philosophy of science but is not fully elaborated or explored. This paper aims to address this lack of clear explanation first by clarifying the epistemological issue at hand. Then it introduces an initially attractive account for strikingness that is inspired by the work of Paul Horwich (1982) and adopted by a number of philosophers. The paper identifies two logically distinct accounts that have both been attributed to Horwich and then argues that, when properly interpreted, they can withstand former criticisms. The final two sections present a new set of considerations against both Horwichian accounts that avoid the shortcomings of former critiques. It remains to be seen whether an adequate account of strikingness exists.

The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism, European Journal of Philosophy 26:1 (2018)

Many of the arguments for and against robust moral realism parallel arguments for and against theism. In this article, I consider one of the shared challenges: the explanatory challenge. The article begins with a presentation of Harman’s formulation of the explanatory challenge as applied to moral realism and theism. I then examine two responses offered by robust moral realists to the explanatory challenge, one by Russ Shafer-Landau and another by David Enoch. Shafer-Landau argues that the moral realist can plausibly respond to the challenge in a way unavailable to theists. I argue that Shafer-Landau’s response is implausible as it stands, and that once revised, it will apply to theism just as well. I then argue that Enoch’s response, to the extent that it is plausible, can be used to defend theism as well.

A Reliability Challenge to Theistic Platonism, Analysis 77:3 (2017)

Many philosophers believe that when a theory is committed to an apparently unexplainable massive correlation, that fact counts significantly against the theory. Philosophical theories that imply that we have knowledge of non-causal mind-independent facts are especially prone to this objection. Prominent examples of such theories are mathematical Platonism, robust normative realism, and modal realism. It is sometimes thought that theists can easily respond to this sort of challenge and that theism therefore has an epistemic advantage over atheism. In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to widespread thought, some versions of theism only push the challenge one step further and thus are in no better position than atheism.

Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable, Episteme 14:2 (2017)

Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non-causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non-causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf-Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics (Field 1989; Field 2001), normativity (Enoch 2011), and even logic (Schechter 2010). In this article I offer two closely related accounts for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field’s challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field’s challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries.